Ali Jafar | CRCS | Wednesday Forum Report
Maurisa, a CRCS alumna from the batch of 2011, presented her award-winning paper in Wednesday forum of CRCS-ICRS in 11^th November 2015. Her paper entitled “The Rupture of Brotherhood, Understanding JI-Affiliated Group Over ISIS”, was awarded as best paper in IACIS (International Conference on Islamic Studies) in Manado, September. Maurisa was glad to share her paper with her younger batch. To all the audiences, Maurisa told that winning as best paper was not her high expectation, and it makes her proud.
The presentation began with Maurisa’s statement that the issue of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) are quite to understand in relation to modern terrorism, because we always misread them and sometime we cannot differentiate between ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Maurisa continues her explanation that there are many groups in Iraq and Syria struggling for their power, terrorism is not single but many. ISIS also has supporters in Indonesia such as Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI-Islamic Group) which is considered as a big terrorist organization in Southeast Asia. This group (JI) has disappears from public consciousness, but actually its members have been spreading out. The most fascinating thing that she found is that JI in Indonesia. JI was separated into two, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Jama’ah Anshar at-Tauhid (JAT), and surprisingly JAT itself has internal conflict and divided into two; JAT and JAS (Jama’ah Anshar as Syari’ah).
Maurisa’s paper focused on questions about how does the conflict in Syria resonates with Jihadists in Indonesia, and how does political struggle within MMI show belief in a master narrative. Maurisa used Juergensmeyer’s perspective about cosmic war and the logic of religious violence. In the Juergensmeyer perspective, an ordinary conflict could become religious conflict when it is raised into cosmic level. One of the ways is demonization or Satan-ization of the enemy. In the context of Syria, the demon is Shia group which is blamed for chaotic situation within Sunni community. The master narrative was also about the same language. It is about sadness, it is about the sad feeling of being discriminated and persecuted by Shia.
According to Maurisa, not all jihadist groups support ISIS, indeed MMI was supporting Jabhat an-Nusra. The rupture of this affiliation was based on their differences in the perspective of takfirism (Apostasy). JAT and MMI have different perspectives in defining  what Takfir Am (general apostasy) and takfir Muayyan (specific apostasy) is.
In seeing terrorist movements, although Maurisa saw that Jihad-ism is not monolithic, she revelas that there are five elements which are related each other. There are ideological resonance, strategic calculus, terrorist patron, escalation of conflict and the last is charismatic leadership. Terrorists also use social media, such as Facebook, Youtube and so on, to promote their propaganda, and as soft approach to other Muslims. Based on Maurisa’s research there are 50000 social media accounts to spread ISIS propaganda, but only 2000 are used to spread out propaganda. The most popular social media is Twitter, because a message can be retwited..
In the discussion session, Nida, a CRCS student asked about the current issues in which governments have banning Shi’a celebration in Indonesia, and whether there is any relation with ISIS, and how an Indonesian can be involved in the terrorism. Maurisa answered the question by explaining that Indonesia is about to change. It can be seen in Islamization created room for Islam in the public sphere. Indonesia is vulnerable since Wahabis and Iran have their political goals here and both want to establish their domination to spread out their agenda. Cases in Sampang, Madura, Pakistan and so on cannot be separated from international case. There are long story for transformation of Saudi and Iran. Our country is like something too.  In talking about the entrance gate, Turkey is good entrance from Indonesia to go to Syria. If we see Turkey’s position is also questionable. They deny Isis, but they also support Isis.
Subandri also asked about the ways we interpret jihad are accessible. Therefore there are many interpretations of Jihad. That is what looks like for young Muslim now. Along with Subandri, Ruby also asked about the genealogy of Indonesian Jihadist movement. Like the connection between Indonesia and middle east that coming and potential realignment and the effect of JAT over ISIS.
In seeing connection and global phenomena, a relation between Islam and Middle East, Maurisa explained that in the United State for instance, there is relation if you wear jilbab, you are Muslim, and when you are Muslim, you are ISIS.  “Here we can see the idea about securitization is like Islamophobia”, said Maurisa with showing slide about relation between Indonesia and Middle East. As she explained again “If we look at voice of Islam, we can see that there are solidarities for Syria. It is reported that medical mission in Indonesia, they have collected 1.6 million. For Syria suggesting support for the movement of mujahidin”. Maurisa also explained that globalization is the most responsible for this case. For example many Indonesia Muslims have easy access to Saudi, Iranian, Jihadist web, because of technology and so on. Young Indonesian have a lot of curiosity and they don’t ask to other.
In responding the interpretation of jihad, Maurisa gives a feedback, how do we interpret this? What makes cosmic war happen? And how to deal with them?. Maurisa began her explanation that in Islam, although there are many verses for killing, but it not necessary to do in violence. We have many steps in interpretation. There are many reasons for what make Muhammad approve of killing and in what context he did so. There are many possibilities to interpret jihad and there are many verses of good thing about Jihad. In talking about cosmic war, she said that “as long as we consider our enemy as Satan, or evil, meaning it is cosmic war”. At the end of discussion session, Maurisa concluded that the factor of jihad is not monolithic; there are many factors, even in ISIS and Al-Qaeda have different perspectives about jihad.
(Editor: Gregory Vanderbilt)

Azis Anwar Fachrudin | CRCS | Article
As the Islamic State (IS) organization destroyed ancient statues aged thousands of years at the Mosul museum in Iraq last month, almost at the same time some Muslims demanded that the Jayandaru statues in the Sidoarjo town square in East Java should be torn down too. Their reasons were similar: They regarded the statues as idols being worshipped and idolatry is considered part of polytheism or shirk, the biggest and most unforgivable sin in Islam. Sadly, the demands in Sidoarjo were primarily supported by GP Ansor, the youth wing of the supposedly “moderate” Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
NU is often associated with being against “purification” (a literal interpretation of Islam) and it usually would be in the forefront of safeguarding “holy graves” against the threat of destruction, particularly the graves where those considered Muslim saints are buried. The NU highly condemns IS, including its blasting of holy shrines like the tomb of the Prophet Jonah (Yunus) in Iraq, and the actions of al-Nusra, such as its destruction of the grave of the leading imam an-Nawawi in Syria.
In fact, the embryo of NU in the early 20th century was a movement protesting the destruction of tombs of respected Muslim figures and sites that had historic importance for Muslims in Saudi Arabia (named Hijaz at that time). The destruction was carried out under the convictions of Wahhabism that regarded those shrines as sources of shirk.
What we are now dealing with is here, however, are statues, which is different from the contentious status of holy tombs. Many Muslims still visit graves of the holy figures; there is no clear prohibition of such a practice in primary Islamic sources of teachings. Yet there are several explicit prohibitions based on hadiths or prophetic traditions (which are secondary sources) of making full-figured statues or images of living creatures, either human or animal.
IS justifies its actions with those hadiths, relying also on the narrated story that the Prophet Muhammad commanded the destruction of statues (or, to be precise, idols) surrounding the Ka’ba in the eighth year following his conquest of Mecca.
The same justification was employed also by Afghanistan’s Taliban when in 2001 they blew up the two giant statues of Buddha in Bamiyan made in the 6th century — without knowing that there is no concept of a personal God in Buddhism, which is a non-theistic religion, and the statues of Shakyamuni Buddha are not subject to worship in the sense understood by monotheists.
That is it. Without denying the possibility of the political or economic factors in the aforementioned cases, the question here is whether Islam promotes iconoclasm or the destruction of idols. Iconoclasm is not unique to Islam (or, to be exact, Muslims); Judaism and Christianity also share history or scriptural teachings of iconoclasm. The story of the golden statue of a calf in the time of Moses is shared by the three religions. Iconoclasm was commanded by Hezekiah, the king of Judah (Two Kings 18:4) and King Josiah (Two Kings 23:1-20).
It appears also in the rabbinical Midrash, the story of Abraham as the iconoclast destroying idols made by his father. In Christianity, disputes over iconoclasm occurred in the Byzantine and Protestant Reformation era.
That is what is narrated in the scripture or “history”. As for Islam, while the Prophet Abraham is reported in the Koran to be destroying idols (asnam) of his people (Koran 21:52-67), the holy book says of King Solomon, considered a prophet by Muslims, that “they [the jinns] made for him [i.e. Solomon] what he willed: synagogues and statues [tamathil], basins like wells and boilers built into the ground.”
The Koranic terminology appears to differentiate between a mere statue (timthal) and an idol or statue being worshipped (sanam).
Muslim scholars all agree that it is prohibited for Muslims to worship statues because it makes them idolatrous. But that distinction between timthal and sanam matters very much when it comes to the contentious status of statues that are not worshipped.
Some Muslim scholars, such as the leading reformer Muhammad Abdul, Jadul-Haq (a former Grandsheikh of al-Azhar), and Muhammad Imarah (a renowned Muslim thinker), argued that it is allowed to have statues as long as they are not worshipped.
And in the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), “rulings are based on their raison d’etre [‘illah al-hukm]; when the raison d’etre disappears, the rulings do not prevail.”
That argument is supported by historical evidence of the early Muslim generations. The companions of the Prophet (such as Amr ibn al-Ash in Egypt and Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas in Iraq) led conquests in many places, but did not destroy the ancient statues they found, because those statues were no longer worshipped.
Sphinxes still exist in Egypt. Those Mesopotamian statues had been there for centuries before being demolished by IS. The Bamiyan Buddha statues were there before being attacked by the Taliban.
In fact, when the Taliban were under Mullah Mohammed Omar, he once issued a decree in favor of the preservation of the Bamiyan statues by arguing that, besides the fact that a Buddhist population no longer existed in Afghanistan, the statues could be a potential major source of tourism income for Afghanistan.
Statues in the Borobudur Buddhist temple are also still there, although nine stupas were damaged during the 1985 Borobudur bombing. In general, most Muslims, either as a minority like in India or as a majority like in Indonesia, have no problem with statues, unlike those who prefer a literal interpretation of the Prophet’s sayings, or hadiths. Scripturalism is the very problem of IS-like Muslims; it denies the imperative that scripture must be contextualized with surrounding circumstances and contrasted with historical evidence.
Furthermore, in the heart of the holiest site for Muslims — the Ka’ba — there is a black stone (al-hajar al-aswad), that was venerated in the pre-Islamic pagan era and is kissed by Muslims while doing pilgrimage. That stone is considered sacred by many Muslims; some of them touch it to get sort of blessing or expiation of sins. And in regard to this practice, the second caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab has frequently been quoted as saying, “I know that you are a stone and can neither harm nor benefit anyone. Had I not seen the Messenger kissing you, I would not have kissed you.” That is, it is not statues, images, or stones that matter; it is Muslim minds that do.
For some nahdliyin (NU members), then, can we regard those statues in Sidoarjo as merely statues or stones that are not worshipped?

CRCS offers following courses during the second semester of 2015/2016 academic year. Those courses are open for graduate students (S2/MA and S3/PhD) of humanities and social science, but subject to availability of seats. Non CRCS students interested to enroll for a course(s) should contact Lina Pary (lina_pary@yahoo.com). All courses will begin the first week of February 2016 and continue for 14 weeks.

Azis Anwar Fachrudin | CRCS | Article
In two consecutive days of this week, the world’s two biggest religions commemorate the birth of their respective “founders”: Islam’s Prophet Muhammad (Maulid) and Christianity’s Jesus Christ (Christmas). This is certainly a rare event that will not happen for dozens of years to come.
In Indonesia, both commemorations have officially been declared national holidays. Indonesia is among most Muslim-majority countries in which Maulid constitutes a national public holiday. It is only in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, out of all Muslim majority countries, where Maulid is not a holiday, probably because of the views of clerics there who regard Maulid celebration as Islamically illegitimate and bid’ah (heretical). Besides, Indonesia is among several Muslim-majority countries that recognize Christmas as a national holiday.
This is a momentous time for both Muslims and Christians to reinforce interfaith dialogue — it probably could be incorporated in the agenda of the commemorations.
For Indonesians in particular, it is worth being grateful that the annually held debate among people at the grassroots — on whether saying “Merry Christmas” to Christians is religiously allowed for Muslims — is coming to an end. Additionally, another annual debate on whether Muslims may celebrate Maulid has generally begun decreasing.
In fact, these two debates on Maulid and Christmas are mostly fueled by Wahhabist views. Across the Muslim world, it is mostly the Wahhabists who claim that saying “Merry Christmas” is tantamount to affirming Christian belief on Jesus’ divinity and as such forbidden.
And why is the debate now not as heated as in the previous years? I heard a satirical comment in social media saying that it is because the Wahhabists are nowadays preoccupied with declaring the Shiites infidels. A plausible explanation! The sense of “feeling threatened” has now been shifted from Christians to Shiites, as well as to communists (whose political party no longer exists).
As for interreligious dialogue, now is a good time to recall and to remind Muslims and Christians of the document, A Common Word Between Us and You, which was launched in 2007. Originally an open letter to the Catholic pope, it has now been signed by hundreds of the world’s leading Muslim scholars and intellectuals (it can be accessed at acommonword.com). The document basically conveys that there are more common grounds for peace between Muslims and Christians than conflicting teachings. The document was then responded to by Loving God and Neighbor Together: A Christian Response to A Common Word, which was initially signed by more than 300 Christian leaders and scholars.
These kinds of documents should be more endorsed by respective leaders, clerics and scholars, for at least two reasons. First because, particularly in Indonesia, the document seems to be less exposed to the public. Second, nowadays we see a rising intolerance in the respective worlds. The rise of Islamophobia in the West, not only in Europe but also in the US given the recent phenomenon of presidential hopeful Donald Trump, is a good example.
On the other side, the Muslim world is now suffering from radicalization, resulting in the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) movement. This is why peace-building and tolerance activists should work harder to win the discourse in the respective worlds, including for example by exposing their respective communities to the documents.
As for the Muslim world, the Maulid commemoration can be a good time to reread the Prophet’s biography, not only to praise or glorify him but also to deal with how we should understand his having been a leader of wars in today’s context. Around the globe, Muslims usually celebrate Maulid by reciting salawat (prayers) or madah nabawi (a kind of eulogy to praise the prophet). In Indonesia particularly, Muslims recite books containing Arabic poetry of salawat or madah nabawi. 
I think that in today’s context such a reading of the Prophet’s biography, while good, should be furthered with rereading about the violence surrounding his life. This is important because some Muslims who do violence nowadays quite often justify their acts by citing examples of the violence commanded by the prophet.
Prophet Muhammad, unlike Jesus, was a leader in war. He was involved in nine wars. Furthermore, he dispatched military expeditions at least 38 times. Some early biographers of the Prophet emphasized this aspect; this is why their books were entitled Maghazi (literally “wars”) and it became a genre of biography at the time. All these wars left hundreds of victims and happened during eight years from 2 AH to 9 AH, a period in the last phase of Muhammad’s prophetic ministry when Muslims became quite powerful.
How then should today’s Muslims read those wars led by the Prophet? This has very much to do with Islamic jus ad bellum, especially on what circumstances violence can be justified under Islamic teachings. Rereading these, I think, is more important as a counter interpretation of violent Muslims rather than saying normatively that “Islam is a religion of peace” or that “rahmatan lil-‘alamin” (“the prophet was sent as a mercy for all creatures”).
 

Subandri Simbolon | CRCS | News
Kepala Program Studi CRCS UGM, Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir, meraih Penghargaan Insan Berprestasi UGM 2015 untuk kategori “Publikasi dengan Sitasi Terbaik.” Rektor UGM, Prof. Ir. Dwikorita Karnawati memberikan penghargaan kepada 160 insan terpilih dari 10 kategori dalam malam penganugerahan pada perayaan Dies Natalis UGM, Rabu, 16 Desember 2015. Prof. Dwikorita mengatakan, tujuan acara ini adalah sebagai apresiasi atas capaian dan prestasi yang diraih para sivitas akademika dan alumni UGM..
Penilaian atas kategori “Publikasi dengan Sitasi terbaik” ini dilakukan oleh tim penilai yang ditunjuk oleh Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengabdian Masyarakat (LPPM) UGM. Pelaksanaan penilaian dilakukan dengan memilih artikel yang tercatat pada Scopus dengan jumlah sitasi terbanyak selama 4 tahun terakhir. Selain itu artikel harus ditulis oleh dosen tetap UGM dengan mencantumkan nama UGM sebagai institusi kerjanya. Dalam kurun dua tahun terakhir, Dr. Zainal Abidin Bagir telah mempublikasikan 12 tulisan di jurnal nasional maupun internasional.
Saat dijumpai di kantor CRCS UGM, pria yang akrab dipanggil Pak Zein ini mengaku tidak mengetahui perihal pemilihan tersebut. Bahkan, dosen pengampu mata kuliah Religion, Science, and Ecology ini cukup terkejut ketika dihubungi untuk menghadiri malam penganugerahan. Namun, ia senang atas apresiasi yang diberikan oleh Universitas Gadjah Mada.
Sebagai insan terbaik dalam kategori “Publikasi dengan Sitasi Terbaik”, Dr. Zainal memiliki pesan khusus untuk publik, “Kita sadar di Indonesia ini agak susah untuk urusan menulis, tetapi itu harus. Dengan segala keterbatasan, penting untuk selalu mencari dan mencuri waktu. Di Indonesia, kalau dibandingkan dengan banyak universitas lain di luar negeri, dosen sering kali terlalu banyak dibebani dengan tugas yang macam-macam termasuk tugas administratif yang menghabiskan waktu untuk menulis. Untuk universitas-universitas, para insan akademis perlu di-support supaya ada waktu untuk menulis.”

A. S. Sudjatna | CRCS | News
Agama tidak perlu dibela. Yang perlu dibela adalah inti dari agama: keadilan dan kebenaran. Kurang lebih seperti itulah hal yang diungkapkan oleh Elga Sarapung di awal pemaparannya dalam diskusi bertema “Atas Nama Agama? Sebuah Tinjauan atas Kekerasan di Singkil dan Tolikara”, Jumat, 11 Desember 2015. Diskusi ini menampilkan dua orang pembicara, Elga Sarapung dari Interfidei dan Rizal Panggabean, staf pengajar di Departemen Hubungan International, UGM.
Diskusi yang diselenggarakan oleh Institute of International Studies (IIS), Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan International, Fakultas Fisipol, UGM, ini merupakan sebuah refleksi atas peringatan hari HAM (Hak Asasi Manusia) sedunia yang jatuh tiap tanggal 10 Desember. Diharapkan, dengan adanya diskusi ini para mahasiswa dan kalangan akademisi lainnya dapat memahami secara lebih komprehensif dua kasus kekerasan atas nama agama yang belum lama ini terjadi di ujung barat dan timur wilayah Indonesia. Diskusi ini berlangsung selama sekitar dua jam setengah dan dihadiri oleh lebih dari lima puluh peserta dari kalangan akademisi dari berbagai fakultas.
Dalam diskusi yang dimoderatori Ayu Diasti Rahmawati—staf pengajar departemen HI UGM—ini, Elga menyampaikan kekerasan yang terjadi di Tolikara, Papua, maupun kekerasan yang terjadi di Singkil, Aceh, memang tak lepas dari faktor agama. Pernyataannya tersebut didasarkan pada berbagai fakta yang ia temukan di lapangan. Menurutnya, ada intoleransi di dalam kedua kasus tersebut. Oleh sebab itu, menurut Elga, kita tidak boleh selalu memandang agama sebagai faktor yang tidak mungkin menjadi sumber terjadinya tindak kekerasan. “Jangan takut untuk mengkritik agama,” tegasnya.
Untuk menguatkan pernyataannya tersebut, Elga menunjukkan beberapa argumen. Ia menyebutkan bahwa sikap intoleran yang ditunjukkan oleh GIDI dengan membuat surat edaran yang melarang umat Islam  mengadakan perayaan Idul Fitri sangatlah jelas. Bahkan, sikap intoleran GIDI tersebut tidak hanya ditujukan terhadap komunitas yang berbeda agama, melainkan juga terhadap sesama Kristen, seperti yang mereka lakukan terhadap umat Advent. Dalam hal ini, Elga juga mengutip ucapan Ustadz Ali Muchtar saat acara peletakan batu pertama pembangunan kembali masjid di Tolikara, “Saya tidak bisa tidur semalam. Kenapa GIDI tidak diundang dalam acara ini? Yang kami butuhkan adalah pengakuan dari warga GIDI.” Menurut Elga, ucapan Ustadz Ali Muchtar ini menunjukkan kemungkinan adanya sikap-sikap intoleran yang dialami oleh mereka selama ini.
Oleh sebab itu, menurut Elga, faktor agama dalam kasus Tolikara ini sangat kuat. Begitu pula dengan kasus di Singkil, Aceh. Elga menunjukkan bagaimana tekanan umat Islam terhadap minoritas Kristen yang ada di sana begitu kentara. Hal ini terlihat dalam perjanjian yang terjadi di antara kelompok umat Islam dan Kristen mengenai pembatasan jumlah gereja yang boleh dibangun. Menurut Elga, perjanjian mengenai pembatasan jumlah gereja yang terjadi sejak 1979 dan diperbarui pada 2001 tidaklah logis. Sebab, dalam kurun waktu selama itu, jumlah umat Kristen dan luas wilayah yang dihuni oleh mereka pastilah bertambah. Konsekuansinya, penambahan jumlah gereja sangat dibutuhkan. Selain itu, sebagaimana ditambahkan oleh Rizal, adanya keterlibatan organisasi Islam dalam mobilisasi massa pada kasus Singkil semakin menunjukkan peran agama dalam soal tindak kekerasan ini.
Berdasarkan bukti-bukti tersebut dan beberapa fakta lainnya yang ditemukan di lapangan, Elga berkesimpulan bahwa memang agama memainkan peran yang sangat penting di dalam dua kasus kekerasan tersebut. Meskipun demikian, baik Elga maupun Rizal tidak menampik adanya faktor lain yang dapat mengeskalasi kedua konflik tersebut, misalnya faktor ekonomi dan kekuasaan. Dalam hal ini, Rizal mengungkapkan bahwa kemungkinan adanya kecemburuan sosial antara warga asli dan pendatang di Singkil sangat besar. Sebab, menurut Rizal, kebun sawit di Singkil banyak dimiliki oleh para pendatang dari Tapanuli yang kebanyakan dari mereka beragama Kristen. Adanya kecemburuan sosial pendatang-pribumi ini tentu saja tidak dapat dilepaskan dari program transmigrasi oleh pemerintah. Begitu pula, denominasi gereja baru yang banyak bermunculan  di Papua tidak menutup kemungkinan bagi hadirnya konflik antara maupun antar-agama di sana.
Selain menyingung banyak soal peranan agama pada—khususnya—kedua kasus kekerasan tersebut, baik Elga maupun Rizal juga sama-sama menyoroti peran pemerintah dan aparat keamanan. Keduanya menganggap bahwa pemeritah—yang direpresentasikan oleh aparat keamanan—memiliki andil yang cukup besar dalam proses terjadinya dua kekerasan tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Elga mencontohkan bahwa saat para pemuda GIDI hendak menegur pihak umat Islam saat melakukan salat Idul Fitri di lapangan yang terhalang oleh landasan pesawat, seharusnya aparat keamanan bisa mengantisipasinya. Sebab, menurut Elga, tidak mungkin para pemuda GIDI tersebut dapat lolos dari pantauan petugas keamanan saat menyeberangi landasan pesawat menuju lokasi shalat Idul Fitri. Begitu juga pada kasus Singkil, seharusnya aparat dapat mengantisipasi kejadian pembakaran gereja sebab isu tersebut sudah muncul dan makin menguat beberapa hari sebelumnya. Contoh lain, misalnya, kasus Syiah di Sampang menunjukkan betapa aparat negara terlibat secara langsung dalam proses terjadinya kekerasan. Ada salah seorang aparat negara yang secara terbuka memprovokasi masyarakat untuk melakukan tindakan intoleran terhadap kelompok Syiah. Namun, pada semua kasus tersebut, negara belum mampu bersikap tegas dan cepat tanggap dalam penegakan hukum.
Sebagai konklusi dari acara diskusi ini,  setidaknya ada lima hal yang perlu dilakukan untuk meredam atau menangani kasus kekerasan atas nama agama. Pertama, mencari akar masalah pencetus terjadinya kekerasan. Dalam hal ini termasuk melihat kembali pemahaman seseorang atau sekelompok orang tentang agamanya serta implementasinya. Hal ini penting sebab agama memiliki pengaruh amat signifikan terhadap pengambilan sikap dan keputusan seseorang. Kedua, melakukan pengelolaan perbedaan dengan sungguh-sungguh. Hal ini dapat dilakukan oleh setiap pribadi maupun kelompok agama. Ketiga, melakukan solidaritas konstruktif, bukan destruktif. Misalnya, saat terjadi kekerasan terhadap sebuah kelompok di suatu wilayah, maka kelompok yang sama di wilayah lain seyogianya tidak melakukan balas dendam terhadap rival kelompoknya yang ada di wilayah mereka. Keempat, negara harus kuat, tegas, jelas, dan adil dalam penegakan hukum bagi setiap kasus tindakan kekerasan atas nama agama. Kelima, pemimpin negara dan para tokoh agama harus solid baik dalam ucapan mapun tindakan konkret dalam menjaga toleransi agama. Selain kelima hal itu, hadirnya aspek norma dan perilaku serta aspek kelembagaan dalam proses mewujudkan toleransi beragama sangatlah penting.