PEMBICARA
Dr. Ammar Fauzi
Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Islam Sadra, Jakarta
“Esoterisme Islam: Aspek Kesejarahan dan Keperadaban dari Relasi Esoterisitas dan Rasionalitas”
Salah satu isu yang, kendati klasik, terus manjadi sorotan penelitian dalam filsafat agama ialah relasi esoterisitas dan rasionalitas. Banyak dimensi yang mungkin disoroti, entah dalam dimensi ontologis, dimensi epistemologis, dan dimensi teologis. Dimensi lain yang kiranya patut mendapatkan porsi perhatian yang sama ialah aspek kesejarahan dan keperadaban. Seperti juga isu komparatif lainnya, esoterisitas dan rasionalitas ditelaah hingga kerap mengawali polarisasi dua kutub ekstrem: ifrath dan tafrith.
Bagi masyarakat beragama, isu ini dengan seperangkat dimensinya tampak krusial, terutama tatkala mempengaruhi iman sebagai elemen dasar keberagamaan. Keberadaan dan sikap seorang beriman di dunia juga terdefinisikan secara lebih ketat oleh pola penanganannya terhadap relasi antara rasionalitas dan esoterisitas. Keseimbangan dua kutub relasi ini kiranya perlu diangkat sebagai bagian dari upaya menegaskan kehadiran iman keagamaan dalam pembangunan peradaban dan pembinaan sosial.
islam
Abstract
My thesis is a critical analysis of the galleries of Islamic Art in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Met) in New York as a case study for contemporary understandings and representations of Islam through the display of Islamic art in a post-9/11 context. I explore the revival of Islamic art exhibitions since the events of September 11, 2001, where museums across the world have found themselves tasked with building and reconfiguring the display of Islamic art objects to provide visitors with a counter-narrative to the widespread fear of Islam propagated by mass media. By tracing the intertwined histories of the Islamic art discipline, colonial and post-colonial collecting practices, Orientalism and the universal survey museum, I situate my critique of the galleries within the complex realities of cultural heritage management in order to address the problematic limitations of this curatorial counter-narrative.
Speaker
Ruby Robina Saha is a Shansi English Language Teaching Fellow at Universitas Gadjah Mada. She divides her time between CRCS, where she co-teaches the Academic English course and the preparatory Summer Intensive course, and the English Language & Literature Department in the Faculty of Cultural Sciences (FIB). Prior to her appointment as a Shansi Fellow, Ruby received her BA(Hons) from Oberlin College, where she majored in Art History and Middle Eastern Studies. In 2013, she was awarded the Laurine Mack Bongiorno Prize for Art History majors, and she studied Art History and Politics at the University of Paris, where she carried out research on the galleries of Islamic art at the Louvre Museum. She wrote her graduating thesis on the politics of displaying Islamic art in Western museums after 9/11. Ruby has worked as an editor and contributing writer for several publications including The Wilder Voice, The Oberlin Review and Jurnal Humaniora. Since returning to Indonesia, her research interests have shifted to the intersection between culture and education policy, contemporary art and alternative media. After her fellowship, she plans to continue working in education and culture and intends to pursue a graduate degree in Arts Education in 2017.
Abstract
Contemporary Muslim discourse on Islam and ecology displays a strong normative approach which deduces its views on Islam and environmental issues from the main textual sources of Islam. However, recent works on the ecological practices of Muslim individuals and communities are showing that such practices are not merely implementations of text-based norms; rather, they also engender new arguments and understandings. Putting attention only to normative debates tends to ignore the fact of pluralism within Islam and different ways of reading the Islamic texts, and the diversity of Muslim eco-practices as well. Following an examination of this discourse, this study focusses on how one Muslim eco-practitioner has developed, justified, and defend eco-friendly practices, and his ideas about Islam and ecology are lived through his practices. It shows that ecological practices not only apply normative texts, but also function in the formation of “Islamic views of nature” and “Islamic environmental ethics”. Finally this presentation also produces different narratives on Islam and ecology which need to be acknowledged and may prove more inspiring for advocacy than the apologetic ones.
Speaker
Najiyah Martiam earned her Bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Technology from Gadjah Mada University (UGM). After spending 4 years working on reproductive health issues, she came back to UGM to study for her Master’s degree in religious studies at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) where she currently works as public education staff. She is also researching Islam and ecology, and practising permaculture with her community. Her interests include religion and science, religion and ecology, Sufism and women’s spirituality, and music and spirituality.
Farihatul Qamariyah | CRCS | Thesis Review
The discourse of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans gender identities) is being contested everywhere lately in global discussion. Identity, gender, and human rights have generally provided the frame work for debate. The issue of LGBT is also critically regarded as a significant case within religion. Scholars such as Kecia Ali and Scott Kugle are attempting to reinterpret and rethink Islam as a religion which is commonly understood as a blessing for all of mankind, in which contextually this religious essence also can accommodate diversity that extends to the acceptance of LGBT Muslims. Another example of this rethinking is the CRCS Student’s, Hary Widyantoro, thesis Rethinking Waria Discourse in Indonesian and Global Islam which examines the collaboration between Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic University activists and Waria santri at the Pesantren Waria al-Fatah which is located in Yogyakarta.
This research looks at the collaboration of scholar activists from Syariah and Law Faculty of Nahdlatul Ulama University of Jepara and waria santri (students of Islam who are born male but identify as feminine, terms discussed below), in rethinking and reconstructing the subjectivity of waria in Indonesian Islamic, thinking through the engagement of activities including in the space of social structure and religious lives. Significantly, this study can be a critical instrument in the field of both gender and religious studies, to examine how these scholar-activists are creating new ways of seeing waria from Qur’an and hadith and of teaching Islam to them as the subjects rather than objects of research. Moreover, it shows the process of rethinking which can offer an alternative view and hope for those who are not associated in the binary gender of male and female. The research questions which are raised up are: how do the scholar activists of Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic University of Jepara rethink the waria subject position? How did they develop the idea of religious partnership with the Pesantren Waria al-Fatah Yogyakarta? And what kind of waria discourse that the scholar activists suggested to provide a room for waria in social and religious lives?
It is clear that the discourse of LGBT however is not only talked over in the stage of global, but also at a local level such as in Indonesia. To see the case of waria santri in terms of transgender discourse and the activism of NU scholars in the act of collaboration, the author utilizes the theoretical application on Boellstorff’s idea on global and local suggestion and Foucault’s on the term of subjectivity as well as power relation in his genealogical approach. In analysis, using waria as the chosen terminology in this case marks their identity as a local phenomenon rather than transgender women to use a global term. This term became the primary term for this group after it was used by Minister of Religious Affairs Alamsyah in the 1970s. While taking the framework of Boellstorff on subjectivity and power relation, it helps the author in figuring out and understanding completely on how Muslims activists from NU University rethink of waria discourse, and how it is discussed by Muslims activist and the waria in the Pesantren. Additionally, subjectivity becomes the key point where the author can examine the role of waria based on the activists’ perspectives as a subject of their religiosities and of the truth of their beings, rather than only objects of views.
Waria as one of the local terms in Indonesia represents an actor of transgender in LGBT association that often experience such discrimination and become the object of condemnation. For waria, Identity is the main problem in the aspect of gender in Indonesian law. For instance, Indonesian identity cards only provide a male and female gender options, based on the Population Administration Law, and by the Marriage Law (No. 1/1974). By this law, they will have some difficulties to access the public services. Another problem regarding the social recognition, waria is perceived as people with social welfare problems, based on the Regulation of the Ministry of Social Affairs (No. 8/2012) that must be rehabilitated as a kind of solution. Furthermore, in the religious landscape, the content of fiqh (an Islamic jurisprudence) does not have much discussion on waria matters when compared to male and female stuff. Briefly, these are the problems that the scholar activists seek to answer.In the local course of Indonesian context, scholar-activists at Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic University of Jepara (UNISNU) educate Islamic religion to transgender students at the Pesantren Waria al-Fatah as the act of acknowledging their existence and their subjectivity to express identity and religiosity within ritual as well as practice.
Addressing this complicated context, the questions of transgender discourse represented by santri waria in this research is not only about the constitutional rights but also attach their religious lives in terms of Islamic teaching and also practice. While what the scholars identify as “humanism” is the basic framework in dealing with this issue, the universal perception of humanism in secular nature is different from the Muslim scholars’ understanding the idea of humanism when it relates to Islamic religion. Referring to this discussion, the NU activists have another view point in looking at waria as a human and Islam as a religion with its blessing for all mankind without exception. Hence, this overview leads them to rethink and reinterpret the particular texts in Islam, and then work with them in collaboration.
Since the term of collaboration becomes the key word in this research, the author gives a general framework on what so – called a collaboration in relation with the context of observation. The background is on the equal relation between scholar-activists and waria santri in the sense that the activists do not force or impose their perspective on waria. For instance, they allow waria santri to pray and to express their identity based on how they feel comfortable with the condition. In regard to the research process, the author conducted interviews and was a participant observer both in the Pesantren Waria al-Fatah in Yogyakarta and in the UNISNU campus, Jepara. He interviewed six Muslims scholar-activists from UNISNU concerning the monthly program they lead in Pesantren Waria especially about how they rethink waria discourse and its relation to religious and social lives, and another important point is on the scholars’ intention to do the collaboration. Furthermore, the author also draws on the history and programs of the pesantren by interviewing Shinta, who became the leader of the pesantren in 2014 following the death of the founder. He also made use of the Religious Practice Partnering Program’s proposal and accountability report and explored the scholars’ institution and communities where they have relation with to get some additional information about their engagement. The additional context is on the scholars’ affiliation, in this case bringing up the background of Nahdlatul Ulama as one of the biggest Muslims socio-religious organization known as Muslim Traditionalist and Indonesian Muslim Movement (PMII) which both of them apply the similar characteristic on ideology which is ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah.
To some extent, the collaboration of scholar activists of Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic University and the santri waria at Pesantren Waria Al Falah rethinks the waria subject position in both their social and religious lives. First, they rethink the normative male – female gender binary which is often considered deviant, an assumption which causes the waria to experience rejection and fear in both their social and religious lives. The same thing happens as well in Islamic jurisprudence known as fiqh, where discussion of waria is absent and, consequently, they find it difficult to express their religiosities, including even whether to pray with men in the front or women behind, and which prayer garments to put on in order to pray.
According to Nur Kholis, the leader of the program from NU University and a scholar of fiqhwhose academic interest is the place of waria in Islamic Law, one answer can be found by categorizing waria as Mukhanats, and then considering them as humans equally as others. He argues that waria have existed since the Prophet’s time considered as mukhanats (a term for the men behave like women in Prophet’s time, according to certain hadith) by nature, or by destiny, and not by convenience. Understanding waria as mukhanats based on their gender consciousness can be a gate for waria to find space in Islam and also their social lives. The following significant finding related to this context is on the genealogy of the process of rethinking waria subject position. The author argues that this rethinking is grounded in Islamic Liberation theology and the method of ahl sunnah wa al-jama’ah, as way of thinking within PMII and NU have contributed and influenced how the activists think of waria subject discourse.
The last important landscape is on the perspective seeing waria as the subject of knowledge, sexualities, and religiosities, covered by the term gender consciousness. This term is the result of rethinking and acknowledging waria subjectivity in understanding their subject position in social and religious lives.Pragmatically, this statement provides a tool of framework to recognize waria as equally with others. It can be seen from the real affiliation of several events, which are parts of Religious Practice Partnering Program, such as Isra’ Mi’raj and Fiqh Indonesia Seminar. Furthermore, this kind of recognition emerges within the global and local concept of Islamic liberation theology and aswaja that make them consider waria as minorities which should be protected, rather than discriminated.
Finally, in such reflection, the discourse of LGBT represented by waria santri, the activism of NU scholars, and their interaction in collaboration notify an alternative worldview to discern a global issue from the local context, in this case is Indonesia. The author concludes the result of this research by saying that this kind of discourse is formed through referring Islamic liberation theology, aswaja, and more specifically the term mukhanats, within global Islam. In the process of interaction, these are interpreted and understood within local context of Indonesia presented by waria case in terms of social and religious life through the act of collaboration under the umbrella of Nahdlatul Ulama and PMII, as organizations tied by aswaja both ideology and methodology. In brief, the rethinking of waria space in the context of Indonesian Islam at the intersection of local and global offers a new expectation and gives a recommendation for all people who do not fit gender binaries but they seek religious practice and experience in their lives.
Rethinking Waria Discourse in Indonesian and Global Islam: The Collaboration between Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic University Activists and Waria Santri | Author: Hary Widyantoro (CRCS, 2013)
Two of the most challenging questions faced by those promoting freedom of speech is to what extent speech is free and whether there are kinds of speech which should be restricted. Very often this brings about a dilemma, since restriction can be seen as the opposite of freedom. This is partly because there are people who can utilize the freedom of speech to spread hatred or incite harm to other people or to the well-being of society in general. The question: Is there room for hate speech within free speech? How should hate speech be defined? On February 15, 2016, CRCS student Azis Anwar Fachrudin interviewed Mark Woodward on the question of religious hate speech. Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University (ASU) and is also affiliated with the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict there. He was a Visiting Professor, teaching at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University, for several years. He has written books related to Islam in Java and Indonesian Islam in general, as well as more than fifty scholarly journal articles, including “Hate Speech and the Indonesian Islamic Defenders Front” co-authored with several others including CRCS alumnus Ali Amin and ICRS alumna Inayah Rohmaniyah and published by the ASU Center for Strategic Communication in 2012. On February 17, 2016, he presented in the CRCS/ICRS Wednesday Forum, on the subject of “Hate Speech and Sectarianism.”
***
Hate speech is quite complex to define, but if someone asks you about it, how would you first define and explain it?
There is no any academic or political consensus on what is and what is not hate speech. It varies considerably from one country to the next when we’re thinking about it in political or legal ways. I think though that we can say that hate speech does two things. It treats or defines people as being less human and in higher level involves demonization. And that’s sometimes quite literal. One of the reasons why I use FPI [Islamic Defenders Front; in Indonesian, Front Pembela Islam, abbreviated as FPI] as an example is that it is so clear when they say, for example, Azyumardi is iblis [the devil]…
Or Ahok is kafir [an infidel] … this counts as hate speech?
Yes, calling people iblis is one level up. At its highest level, hate speech is defining people as archetype of evil. Once you define people in these ways, then you’re just defied, at least in your mind, in calling for the organization to be outlawed. Sometimes, [you’re called] to kill them. We’ve seen that.
So, there are scales of hate speech…
Ya, scales. Lower level of hate speech would be simply saying that a group or an individual is sesat or deviant, and it moves up from there… at the highest level it calls “kill them!” Literally calling for violence. In almost any level it can be used to justify violence; it can be used for purposes of political mobilization. That’s particularly powerful when it’s used by either large NGOs or by governments.
Your paper is opened by a quite provocative statement. It says, “FPI is a domestic Indonesian terrorist organization.” How can you say that it’s terrorist?
It is a terrorist organization; it deliberately seeks to terrorize people. Terror is a state of mind; it is a psychological and sociological term. It is spreading extreme fear in people. This is what FPI does…
But they would certainly reject to be called terrorist…
Most certainly they reject it, so does Jamaah Islamiyah; they would respond that they weren’t terrorist; they were mujahidin. No one, or very few people, will say “I am a terrorist.” But look at what they do, though. They threaten people; they terrify, beat and sometimes kill them. I have no problem calling them terrorist at all.
So you’re prepared to take the risk of saying that.
I’m perfectly prepared to call them terrorists. This is an academic judgment. I know that there are people who for political reason would restrict the use of terrorism, to think like suicide bombing. But that’s a political judgment, not an academic judgment.
To support your thesis, you’re collecting data from what FPI has done to particularly Ahmadis and those who are considered to be deviant…
Anyone they consider to be deviant… and people who don’t fast during Ramadan, or gay and lesbian people, and increasingly Shia…
But I think there’s one thing quite important from [FPI founder] Habib Rizieq as he was once giving a sermon, I watched it on Youtube, in which he’s making three categories of Shiites (Ghulat, Rafidah, Mu’tadilah). Have you made a note about this?
I have not seen that. I very much like to. Habib Rizieq has been somewhat more reluctant to be critical of Shia than he has of Ahmadiyah and liberals. Most of the examples that we use in that paper are about liberals. It has been successful to the extent that people are now very reluctant to call themselves liberals. If you’re calling yourself a liberal, you’re putting yourself at risk.
Actually the attackers of Shiites in Sampang were not FPI, right? And this is particularly because FPI has a view on Shia that is different from theirs.
There are a lot of different organizations that are behind anti-Shia, as well as anti-Ahmadiyah. One of the alarming features of this is that hatred toward Shia has brought people who normally would not be on the same side. Very good example of that is, if you look at Forum Umat Islam and their publication called Suara Islam, then you look at the editorial board… you have Habib Rizieq, and you have [Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid’s leader] Abu Bakar Baasyir. And Baasyir is Salafi-Wahabi.
Salafi-Wahabi?
It’s clear from what he has written; it’s clear from the people he denounces. He speaks frequently and forcefully about concepts like bid’ah, khurafat, syirik, denouncing ziarah kubur, and things like that. And Habib Rizieq is… habib… (who likes to gather people to do) salawat…
Closer to NU in terms of rituals…
Closer to NU, and to other habibs [a title typically referring to Prophet Muhammad’s descendants]. I’ve been to events at the masjid and bazaar near FPI and you have salawat, you have maulid, all the things… If you went to see Habib Luthfi, you would see the same sort of ritual. So this is a new development in political Islam in Indonesia. You would find those groups on the same side; it is really only hatred of someone else that brings them together.
A common enemy creates a new alliance…
That’s right. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
One of your main theses in that paper is that the government cannot stop FPI violence because it fears appearing non-Islamic. Does that imply that what FPI has done is actually in accordance with the common will of the people they’re trying or pretending to defend?
That’s a very difficult question. It does seem to be clear that at least at the beginning—maybe no longer true—FPI was linked to elements within the police and military. I don’t think that the majority of Indonesians support the sweepings. We haven’t seen these recently as much as we had; they were for a while. But there are many people who are afraid to oppose them publicly because there are threats.
Because of threats or because what FPI is doing is Islamic?
Well, there are people who would agree with what they say, but not agree with their methods. There are people who would be very strong political opponent of Shia and Ahmadiyah on religious ground, but they would not consider violence to be justified. We need to be very clear on those differences. The issue is not whether or not you agree with someone’s religion. I may not agree with Salafi-Wahabi teachings, but I’m not going to go and say that they should be killed. It’s criminality, not theology. It’s actions that are important… or inciting violence. That’s very complicated and you’ll question. There is a paradox, between controlling hate speech and defending free speech. This is a paradox that has no clear resolution; no easy answer.
I think one of the political strategies to minimize or to stop FPI violence is to cut the ties between FPI and the police.
Well, that’s definitely one thing that needs to be done. I don’t even know whether this still operates. Certainly the police are not willing to clamp down on them very hard. There are some people who think that if they did, it would only get worse. There are other people who think they don’t have the power to do that. But I don’t believe that. Because the Indonesian security forces have proven themselves to be extremely effective in cracking down groups like Jamaah Islamiyah. If they wanted… if they decided to shutdown FPI, they could. I don’t have any doubt about that. FPI does have a much broader basis of support than Jemaah Islamiyah. Because they are not talking about things like establishing a caliphate…
They are talking more about amar ma’ruf nahy munkar [Quranic injunction to “enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong”]…
Yeah, and they are talking about aliran sesat [heretical movements].
And basically it doesn’t have a problem with Pancasila, right?
No, it doesn’t have a problem with Pancasila. Honestly, groups like FPI and partly MMI are more difficult to deal with than Jamaah Islamiyah…
Because they can operate within the government…
Because they can operate within the government… and they can operate basically within the framework of things that are considered to be religiously acceptable. Being habib has a great deal of prestige.
Rizieq’s “habib-ness” makes a great deal…
His habib-ness is part of what gives him religious authority for many people. This is certainly true of many of his followers…. preman [gangsters], and some mantan preman.
Coming back to the topic of hate speech. Do you think Indonesia should have a law banning hate speech, such as calling others as kafir or…?
There are some regulations that were issued by the national police; no one pays any attention to them. But I think this is a political choice that only the people of Indonesia can make. No matter what choice they make, there will be people who will be critical. And again, if you look at this in a world wide way, in functioning democracies, you’ll find, for example, in the United States you can say the most terrible thing you want. But in Germany, if you say anything good about Nazis or if you display Nazi symbols, you get arrested. There is a wide range of strategies.
Yeah, limits on free speech create new dilemmas…
Right, that’s absolutely right. A strong government would not tolerate hate speech. On the other hand, maybe there are other people who would say this is a price we have to pay for democracy. This is where the paradox comes. Democracy is always messy and noisy.
Would you prefer to say that, for example, [rising FPI leader] Sobri Lubis who was saying that it is lawful to shed the blood of Ahmadis should not be punished?
He probably crosses the line, because he very clearly says kill the people and directly incites a crime. I don’t think it causes problem with free speech to prosecute people who encourage others to kill people. This is probably the line. Actively encouraging violence is probably the line.
So, one line that, I think, can be agreed on by all people is inciting physical violence, right?
I think so. I think you could have a broad consensus of opinion that says that this (encouraging violence) is too much.
One last question. Since you’re mostly dealing with FPI, would you further your research to reach other cases such as, the most recent, Gafatar in Kalimantan Barat and Ahmadiyah in Bangka? They are not done by FPI, but people around them.
Yes. An important question here is, what are the social processes at work? In the last ten years, there has been a climate that promotes or indirectly promotes this kind of thing; that it becomes socially acceptable in ways that it probably would not have been before. Ahmadis have been in Indonesia peacefully for more than a hundred years. Both Muhammadiyah and NU have issued fatwa that said this is sesat. Nobody did encourage any kind of violence. Shia? No one cared at all, because the Shia didn’t bother any body. All these have been an invented crisis in the last ten years. Who is kambing hitam here? Belum jelas.
Do you think that it has something to do with, like some would say, Wahhabism?
Well, partly. It’s definitely a global phenomenon. The paper that we’re talking about is part of a global research project. And we have seen the same thing in Nigeria, which is a country where there are no Ahmadis and Shia. People there are going around, talking about the danger of the Shia… even though there are no Shias! It is in one way a global phenomenon.
Ok, Pak Mark. That’s all. Thank you so much.
Azis Anwar Fachrudin | CRCS | Interviews
Azis Anwar Fachrudin | CRCS | Article
As the Islamic State (IS) organization destroyed ancient statues aged thousands of years at the Mosul museum in Iraq last month, almost at the same time some Muslims demanded that the Jayandaru statues in the Sidoarjo town square in East Java should be torn down too. Their reasons were similar: They regarded the statues as idols being worshipped and idolatry is considered part of polytheism or shirk, the biggest and most unforgivable sin in Islam. Sadly, the demands in Sidoarjo were primarily supported by GP Ansor, the youth wing of the supposedly “moderate” Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
NU is often associated with being against “purification” (a literal interpretation of Islam) and it usually would be in the forefront of safeguarding “holy graves” against the threat of destruction, particularly the graves where those considered Muslim saints are buried. The NU highly condemns IS, including its blasting of holy shrines like the tomb of the Prophet Jonah (Yunus) in Iraq, and the actions of al-Nusra, such as its destruction of the grave of the leading imam an-Nawawi in Syria.
In fact, the embryo of NU in the early 20th century was a movement protesting the destruction of tombs of respected Muslim figures and sites that had historic importance for Muslims in Saudi Arabia (named Hijaz at that time). The destruction was carried out under the convictions of Wahhabism that regarded those shrines as sources of shirk.
What we are now dealing with is here, however, are statues, which is different from the contentious status of holy tombs. Many Muslims still visit graves of the holy figures; there is no clear prohibition of such a practice in primary Islamic sources of teachings. Yet there are several explicit prohibitions based on hadiths or prophetic traditions (which are secondary sources) of making full-figured statues or images of living creatures, either human or animal.
IS justifies its actions with those hadiths, relying also on the narrated story that the Prophet Muhammad commanded the destruction of statues (or, to be precise, idols) surrounding the Ka’ba in the eighth year following his conquest of Mecca.
The same justification was employed also by Afghanistan’s Taliban when in 2001 they blew up the two giant statues of Buddha in Bamiyan made in the 6th century — without knowing that there is no concept of a personal God in Buddhism, which is a non-theistic religion, and the statues of Shakyamuni Buddha are not subject to worship in the sense understood by monotheists.
That is it. Without denying the possibility of the political or economic factors in the aforementioned cases, the question here is whether Islam promotes iconoclasm or the destruction of idols. Iconoclasm is not unique to Islam (or, to be exact, Muslims); Judaism and Christianity also share history or scriptural teachings of iconoclasm. The story of the golden statue of a calf in the time of Moses is shared by the three religions. Iconoclasm was commanded by Hezekiah, the king of Judah (Two Kings 18:4) and King Josiah (Two Kings 23:1-20).
It appears also in the rabbinical Midrash, the story of Abraham as the iconoclast destroying idols made by his father. In Christianity, disputes over iconoclasm occurred in the Byzantine and Protestant Reformation era.
That is what is narrated in the scripture or “history”. As for Islam, while the Prophet Abraham is reported in the Koran to be destroying idols (asnam) of his people (Koran 21:52-67), the holy book says of King Solomon, considered a prophet by Muslims, that “they [the jinns] made for him [i.e. Solomon] what he willed: synagogues and statues [tamathil], basins like wells and boilers built into the ground.”
The Koranic terminology appears to differentiate between a mere statue (timthal) and an idol or statue being worshipped (sanam).
Muslim scholars all agree that it is prohibited for Muslims to worship statues because it makes them idolatrous. But that distinction between timthal and sanam matters very much when it comes to the contentious status of statues that are not worshipped.
Some Muslim scholars, such as the leading reformer Muhammad Abdul, Jadul-Haq (a former Grandsheikh of al-Azhar), and Muhammad Imarah (a renowned Muslim thinker), argued that it is allowed to have statues as long as they are not worshipped.
And in the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), “rulings are based on their raison d’etre [‘illah al-hukm]; when the raison d’etre disappears, the rulings do not prevail.”
That argument is supported by historical evidence of the early Muslim generations. The companions of the Prophet (such as Amr ibn al-Ash in Egypt and Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas in Iraq) led conquests in many places, but did not destroy the ancient statues they found, because those statues were no longer worshipped.
Sphinxes still exist in Egypt. Those Mesopotamian statues had been there for centuries before being demolished by IS. The Bamiyan Buddha statues were there before being attacked by the Taliban.
In fact, when the Taliban were under Mullah Mohammed Omar, he once issued a decree in favor of the preservation of the Bamiyan statues by arguing that, besides the fact that a Buddhist population no longer existed in Afghanistan, the statues could be a potential major source of tourism income for Afghanistan.
Statues in the Borobudur Buddhist temple are also still there, although nine stupas were damaged during the 1985 Borobudur bombing. In general, most Muslims, either as a minority like in India or as a majority like in Indonesia, have no problem with statues, unlike those who prefer a literal interpretation of the Prophet’s sayings, or hadiths. Scripturalism is the very problem of IS-like Muslims; it denies the imperative that scripture must be contextualized with surrounding circumstances and contrasted with historical evidence.
Furthermore, in the heart of the holiest site for Muslims — the Ka’ba — there is a black stone (al-hajar al-aswad), that was venerated in the pre-Islamic pagan era and is kissed by Muslims while doing pilgrimage. That stone is considered sacred by many Muslims; some of them touch it to get sort of blessing or expiation of sins. And in regard to this practice, the second caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab has frequently been quoted as saying, “I know that you are a stone and can neither harm nor benefit anyone. Had I not seen the Messenger kissing you, I would not have kissed you.” That is, it is not statues, images, or stones that matter; it is Muslim minds that do.
For some nahdliyin (NU members), then, can we regard those statues in Sidoarjo as merely statues or stones that are not worshipped?